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C ~ n ~ t i t ~ t i ~ n a l  Law-DEFAMATION-THE SUPREME COURT 
PLACES FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON DESIGNATION AS A "PUBLIC FIG- 
URE" IN LIBEL ACTIONS- Wok ton v. Reader's Digest Association, 
443 U.S. 147 (1979). 
During 1957 and 1958, a special federal grand jury subpoe- 
naed Ilya Wolston to testify concerning Soviet espionage activity 
in the United States. On July 1, 1958, Wolston failed to appear 
to testify before the grand jury as subpoenaed. Wolston subse- 
quently agreed to plead guilty to a criminal contempt charge 
and received a one-year suspended sentence. During the six- 
week interval between Wolston's failure to appear before the 
grand jury and his sentencing, fifteen newspaper stories concern- 
ing his alleged espionage appeared in New York and Washing- 
ton, D.C.' Although Wolston was never indicted for espionage, 
he was identified as a Soviet agent in a book published in 195ga 
and in an FBI report entitled "Expos6 of Soviet Espionage, May 
1960."9 
Following the publication in January 1974 of a book entitled 
KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Agents (KGB),' Wolston sued 
the book's author, John Barron, and it's publishers for libel.' 
The book detailed Soviet espionage activity in the United States 
after World War I1 and identified Wolston as a Soviet agent? In 
addition, Wolston claimed that a passage in the book falsely 
stated that he had been indicted for espionage.' 
The United States District Court for the District of Colum- 
bia granted the author's and publishers' motions for summary 
judgmentas The district court concluded that Wolston was a 
"public figure" for the "limited purpose of comment on his con- 
nection with, or involvement in, espionage in the 1940's and 
1. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 163 (1979). 
2. B. MORROS, MY TEN YEARS AS A COUNTERSPY (1959). 
3. S. Doc. No. 114, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). 
4. J. BARRON, KGB: THE SECRET WORK OF SOVIET AGENTS (1974). 
5. Reader's Digest Association was the initial publisher and Bantam Books, Mac- 
Millan Book Clubs, and Book-of-the-Month Club were subsequent publishers. 443 U.S. 
at 159 & n.1. 
6. Id. at 159. 
7. Id. at 159-60. 
8. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 429 F. Supp. 167, 180-81 (D.D.C. 1977), aff'd, 
578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978), reu'd, 443 U.S. 157 (1979). 
4501 CASENOTES 451 
1950'~."~ As a result, the New York Times standard of proof ap- 
plied,1° and Wolston was required to prove that the alleged de- 
famatory passages were published with "actual malice."ll The 
district court found that the allegedly libelous passages in KGB 
were ambiguous and that Wolston had failed to demonstrate any 
actual malice.12 The United States Court of Appeals for the Dis- 
trict of Columbia Circuit afErmed.13 
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the D.C. Cir- 
cuit," concluding that the two lower courts had incorrectly clas- 
sified Wolston as a "limited-issue" public figure.15 The Court 
reasoned that Wolston had not " 'voluntarily thrust' or 'injected' 
himself into the forefront of the public controversy surrounding 
the investigation of Soviet espionage in the United States" in 
order to influence public opinion.le Wolston was therefore a pri- 
vate figure and not required to prove the existence of actual 
malice in order to recover.17 
A determination of the standard of liability to apply in a 
defamation action requires a court to balance the state's interest 
in protecting the reptitation of private citizens and the pub- 
lisher's first amendment rights. The Supreme Court has strug- , 
gled to reconcile these two competing values18 in a series of cases 
from which varying constitutional standards concerning defama- 
9. Id. at  176. 
10. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), established that plaintiffs 
who are determined to be "public officials" must prove that the defamation was made 
with "actual malice." Id. at  283-86. Later Court decisions extended the New York Times 
standard to include "public figures." See Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 
(1967). 
11. 429 F. Supp. at  179. "Actual malice" is defined as "actual knowledge of falsity or 
reckless disregard for the truth." Id. at  172. 
12. Id. at  180. 
13. Wolston v. Reader's Digest M n ,  578 F.2d 427, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 
U.S. 157 (1979). The D. C. Circuit determined that Wolston qualified as a public figure 
because of his conviction for criminal contempt. The court stated, "In short, by his vol- 
untary action he invited attention and comment in connection with the public questions 
involved in the investigation of espionage." Id. at  431. 
14. 443 US. 157 (1979). 
15. See note 39 infra. 
16. 443 U.S. at  166. 
17. 443 U.S. at  161. The Court disposed of the case under the public figure issue 
and, as a consequence, did not review the propriety of summary judgment on the issue of 
whether respondents had published the alleged defamation with actual malice. 
18. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974). 
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tion of public figures have evolved.lQ Analysis of the Supreme 
Court's determination that the New York Times standard of 
proof regarding public figures would not apply in Wolston's case 
requires an understanding of the evolution of the New York 
Times standard. 
A. Defamation and Public Figure Status 
In 1964 the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sulli- 
vanM established the "actual malice" standard as a prerequisite 
for liability for defamation of a public official. The case involved 
a political advertisement in the New York Times criticizing the 
manner in which police in Montgomery, Alabama handled civil 
rights demonstrations by black students. Sullivan, one of three 
elected commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama, 
brought a libel action against the paper under Alabama libel law 
and was awarded a $500,000 judgment. The Court reversed the 
judgment after declaring Alabama's law "constitutionally defi- 
cient" in establishing truth as the sole defense for defamatory 
p~blicat ion.~~ The Court held that "a rule compelling [a pub- 
lisher] to guarantee the truth of all his factual  assertion^"^^ de- 
terred criticism of official conduct and therefore violated the 
first and fourteenth amendments."' In response, the Court for- 
mulated the actual malice standard, which provided a privilege 
applicable in a libel action for criticism of public officials. The 
actual malice standard "prohibits a public official from recover- 
ing damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official 
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'ac- 
tual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it is false or with 
19. See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. 
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 
(1971); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 US.  295 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 
U.S. 279 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Greenbelt Coop. Pub- 
lishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 
(1968); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 US.  727 (1968); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. 
Hanks, 389 US.  81 (1967); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 US. 130 (1967); Rosen- 
blatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); Garrison v. h u i -  
siana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US. 254 (1964). See 
generally Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in Constitutional Policy-Making, 61 
MINN. L. REV. 645, 650 n.25 (1977). 
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
21. Id. at 264, 279. 
22. Id. at 279. 
23. Id. at 264, 279. 
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reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."" 
Three years later, in Associated Press v. Walker and Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts,a6 the Supreme Court extended the New 
York Times standard to include "public figures" as well as pub- 
lic officials. Curtis involved a Saturday Evening Post story 
claiming that Butts, the athletic director at the University of 
Georgia, had conspired to fix a college football game.26 Walker 
involved an erroneous Associated Press dispatch describing for- 
mer Major General Edwin Walker's participation in an attempt 
to block the desegregation of the University of Mississippi. Be- 
cause Butts was paid by a private alumni association and be- 
cause Walker had resigned from the Army, neither man could be 
classified as a public official for purposes of the New York Times 
standard. Nevertheless, the concurring opinion by Chief Justice 
Warren stated that individuals like Butts and Curtis, though not 
public officials, may be "intimately involved in the resolution of 
important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape 
events in areas of concern to society at large";27 therefore, the 
New York Times standard should also apply to them. 
In Rosenbloom u. Metromedia, the plurality opinionn 
extended the New York Times standard to defamation actions 
involving private individuals if the defamation concerned mat- 
ters of "public or general interest."" Rosenbloom involved a nu- 
dist magazine distributor allegedly defamed during a radio 
broadcast. The Court decided the distinction between public of- 
ficials or public figures and private individuals in the application 
of the New York Times standard was untenable because the fo- 
cus was on "the conduct of the participant and the content, ef- 
fect, and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior 
anonymity or n~toriety."~~ If the matter was one of "public or 
general intere~t,"~' the status of the participant or the voluntary 
24. Id. at 279-80. 
25. 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (the two cases were consolidated on certiorari). 
26. Graham, The Story of a College Football Fix, SAT. EVE. POST, Mar. 23, 1963, at 
80. 
27. 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring). 
28. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
29. Rosenbloom represented the Supreme Court at its most fragmented point in the 
development of a defamation privilege. Of the eight justices participating, five wrote 
opinions. Id. at 30. 
30. 403 U.S. at 43-44. 
31. Id. at 43. 
32. Id. at 44. 
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nature of his actions should not determine whether the New 
York Times standard applied." As a result, the Court in Rosen- 
bloom extended the New York Times standard to include pri- 
vate individuals involved in events of public or general interest 
and required proof of actual malice in order to recover damages. 
Concluding that the balance between reputational interest 
and first amendment freedoms had tipped too far toward the 
first amendment at the expense of the states' legitimate interests 
in protecting private citizens from defamation, the Court in 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc? rejected the Rosenbloom "public 
interest" test, which had permitted application of the New York 
Times standard to defamation of private citizens. Elmer Gertz, a 
prominent Chicago attorney, had been characterized in a John 
Birch Society publication as a "Leninist" and a "Communist- 
fronter" with a lengthy criminal record." Mr. Gertz sued the 
publisher, who attempted to invoke the New York Times stan- 
dard as a defense, alleging that Gertz satisfied the Rosenbloom 
public interest test by acting as counsel in a controversial law- 
suit. In rejecting this argument, the Court relied primarily on 
the reasoning set forth in Justice Harlan's dissent in Rosen- 
bloom.M The Court recognized two reasons for extending the ac- 
tual malice standard to public figures. First, the Court recog- 
nized that public figures have greater access to the media in 
order to rebut defamation." Second, and of greater importance, 
the Court determined that public figures are less deserving of 
judicial protection since they, like public officials, have usually 
"voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from 
defamatory falsehood concerning them."s8 
The Court in Gertz identified two ways in which an individ- 
ual might attain the stature of a public figure, thereby invoking 
application of the New York Times standard: 
In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive 
fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all pur- 
poses and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual volun- 
tarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public con- 
troversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited 
33. Id. at 43. 
34. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
35. Id. at 326. 
36. 403 U.S. at 70-71. 
37. 418 U.S. at 344. 
38. Id. at 345. 
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range of issues. In either case such persons assume special 
prominence in the resolution of public questions.3* 
The Court concluded that absent either of these conditions the 
individual remains a private figure and that the states may allow 
recovery under any standard short of liability without fault.'O 
Two years later in Time, Inc. u. Firestone," the Court af- 
firmed the Gertz decision. Mrs. Firestone was a Florida socialite 
involved in a widely publicized divorce case. Time magazine's 
alleged libel was a report of the trial court's final judgment as- 
serting that the "extramarital escapades of the plaintiff were bi- 
zarre and of an amatory nature which would have made Dr. 
Freud's hair ~ur l . "~Vn holding Mrs. Firestone to be a private 
figure, the Court emphasized the fact that she had not "thrust 
herself to the forefront of any particular public controversy in 
order to influence the resolution of the issues invol~ed."~~ The 
Court noted that a private divorce, even one generating sensa- 
tional publicity, did not meet the requirement of a "public con- 
troversy" as defined by Gertz." 
B. Lower Courts' Post-Firestone Determination of Public 
Figure Status 
Between Firestone and Wolston, nine of the eleven federal 
courts of appeals considered cases involving determinations of 
public figure status in libel actions. In the ten cases involved, 
only one plaintiff, well-known political columnist and commen- 
tator William F. Buckley, was determined to be a "public figure 
for all purposes and in the classic sense."4s Seven of the deci- 
sions determined that the plaintiffs met the "limited-issue" pub- 
lic figure definition as enunciated in Gertz and interpreted in 
39. Id. at 351. The Court in Gertz provided two somewhat varying definitions of a 
public figure. The narrower definition of a public figure-later adopted by the Court in 
Firestone and Wokton--defines a public figure as follows: "Some occupy positions of 
such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. 
More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront 
of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues in- 
volved." Id. a t  345. 
40. Id. at 347 & n.lO. 
41. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
42. Id. at 450. 
43. Id. at 453. 
44. Id. at 454. The Court declined to "equate 'public controversy' with all controver- 
sies of interest to the public." Id. 
45. Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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Firestone. In the remaining two cases the courts determined 
that the plaintiffs were private figures and, accordingly, that the 
New York Times standard did not apply? 
Of the seven plaintiffs held to be limited-issue public figures 
two were so designated because they conceded public figure sta- 
tus under the facts in their cases. In Appleyard u. Transameri- 
can Press, I ~ c . , ~ '  the Fourth Circuit held that a truckdriver in- 
volved in a test case with the Interstate Commerce Commission 
over unauthorized truckloads48 was a public figure by virtue of 
his acceptance of public figure status: "Appleyard concedes that 
he was a public figure at the time that the alleged libel took 
place."4e Similarly, the Third Circuit in Dickey u. CBS Inc." 
found a member of a Republican board of supervisors to be a 
public figure because he "admitted to being a public fig~re."~' 
46. Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d 626 (10th Cir. 1977); Ryder v. Time, Inc., 
557 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In a Time magazine article detailing abuse of public trust 
by attorneys, the plaintiff in Ryder, Richard J. Ryder, had been mistakenly identified as 
another Virginia attorney, Richard R. Ryder. The latter had been suspended from the 
practice of law for eighteen months for concealing stolen cash and a sawed-off shotgun in 
his safety deposit box. Although the plaintiff, Richard J. Ryder, was politically active in 
his community and was a former state legislator, the D.C. Circuit determined that "these 
public activities had nothing to do with the reference to Richard Ryder in the [Time] 
essay and, in any case, those activities were no longer engaged in by plaintiff." 557 F.2d 
a t  826. The court placed the "public activities of an individual in one sphere, and his 
private status in another." Id. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff was clearly a 
private individual for the issues raised by the Time article. 
In Dixson, the plaintiff had been a vice president of Frontier Airlines while the com- 
pany was suffering severe financial losses. After replacing several of its executives (in- 
cluding the plaintiff) with new management in 1971, Frontier Airlines made a financial 
recovery that was the subject of a Newsweek article in 1972. The Tenth Circuit decided 
that although "the subject of the Newsweek article was of some public interest," the 
"plaintiff Dixson was neither a public official nor a public figure" for purposes of the 
New York Times standard. 562 F.2d a t  628. 
47. 539 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1976). 
48. Appleyard had agreed with the editor of Overdrive magazine to drive an unau- 
thorized truckload from Winston-Salem, North Carolina, to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in Washington, D.C. Their purpose was to force a test case upon the ICC, 
with Overdrive agreeing to fund any litigation costs Appleyard might incur. After a dis- 
pute over financing the suit, Appleyard established his own legal defense fund indepen- 
dent of Overdrive's efforts. Overdrive subsequently published two articles falsely sug- 
gesting that Appleyard had illegally diverted moneys from Overdrive's legal defense fund 
for the personal use of Appleyard and his associates. Id. at 1028. 
49. Id. a t  1029. 
50. 583 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978). Dickey was a member of the Delaware County 
Republican Board of Supervisors. This position was not an elected public office but sim- 
ply part of the local Republican party machinery. Following the board's decision not to 
endorse a local Congressman for reelection, the Congressman on a television talk show 
accused Dickey of accepting a bribe while serving as a board member. Id. at 1222 & n.2. 
51. Id. a t  1227. 
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The appellant was therefore subject to the New York Times 
standard. 
The remaining five plaintiffs were held to be limited-issue 
public figures as a matter of law?' The Third Circuit in Chuy u. 
Philadelphia Eagles Football Clubm determined that a first- 
string professional football player involved in a well-publicized 
contractual dispute with one National Football League team and 
trade to another National Football League team was a limited- 
issue public figure, "at least with respect to his ability to play 
fo~tbal l ."~ The Third Circuit reasoned that professional ath- 
letes "generally assume a position of public prominence" during 
their active playing careersM and that their contractual disputes 
are of great interest to sports fans. Chuy's contract dispute and 
trade was highly publicized and therefore "no mere private con- 
tractual matter."* 
In Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc.," Playboy maga- 
zine had characterized the plaintiff as a "mobster" after media 
reports of his association with organized crime figures. The Fifth 
Circuit found Rosanova to be a public figure with respect to 
commentary on his association with organized crime: "The na- 
ture of his reported associations and activities concerning organ- 
52. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966). In Rosenblatt, the Supreme Court 
indicated that determination of public official (and by inference, public figure) status is 
to be decided as a question of law. The Court stated that "as is the case with questions 
of privilege generally, it is for the trial judge in the first instance to determine whether 
the proofs show respondent to be a 'public official.' " Id. at 88. Accord, Hutchinson v. 
Proxmire, 431 F. Supp. 1311, 1326 (W.D. Wis. 1977), aff'd, 579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978), 
rev'd on other grounds, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). 
Id. 
Id. 
53. 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979). But see 46 TJZNN. L REV. 252 (1978). 
In spite of its ostensible recognition that public-figure status is controversy- 
related, the appeals court failed to apply this standard to plaintiff, thus avoid- 
ing the Gertz-Firestone test, which would have prevented plaintiffs classifica- 
tion as a public figure since he clearly had not entered a public controversy in 
order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. 
at 265. 
54. 595 F.2d at 1280. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. The Third Circuit distinguished Chuy from Firestone as follows: 
We believe that Chuy's public prominence was a good deal more marked 
than the status of the plaintiff in [Firestone]. The former Mrs. Firestone was 
found not to have attained a role of prominence in affairs of society and her 
divorce action was deemed not a public controversy. Although the marital 
troubles of the wealthy do not make them public figures, a professional ath- 
lete's contractual troubles relating to his playing performance commands the 
attention of a more sustained and wider public audience. 
at 1280 n.21 (citations omitted). 
57. 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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ized crime are, without dispute, subjects of legitimate public 
con~ern."~ Morever, the Fifth Circuit rejected Rosanova's con- 
tention that public figure status should be withheld since he had 
not sought media attention. The court held that designation as a 
public figure does not and must not depend on the desires or 
choice of any putative public figure? In this regard, the Fifth 
Circuit stated: 
It is no answer to the assertion that one is a public figure to 
say, truthfully, that one doesn't choose to be. It is sufficient, as 
the district court found, that "Mr. Rosanova voluntarily en- 
gaged in a course that was bound to invite attention and 
c~mment ."~ 
In Orr v. Argus-Press Co.P1 an attorney had been indicted 
for violating Michigan State securities laws through his involve- 
ment in an abortive shopping mall development. The Sixth Cir- 
cuit held that he was a " 'public figure' for the limited purpose 
of reporting on his arrest and indictment and the circumstances 
surrounding the collapse of his shopping mall pr~posal ."~~ The 
Sixth Circuit interpreted Gertz and Firestone to allow classifica- 
tion of a criminal defendant as a limited-issue public figure 
provided 
[hlis conduct in the community is a legitimate matter of public 
interest, the press has publicized his conduct in part as a result 
of his own efforts to obtain publicity, and his conduct has 
made him the target of a criminal proceeding about which the 
public has a need for information and interpretati~n.~~ 
58. Id. at 861. The Fifth Circuit distinguished Rosanova from Firestone by inter- 
preting the Supreme Court's holding in Firestone to suggest that Mrs. Firestone failed to 
become a public figure because the subject matter of the case, her divorce and the at- 
tendant publicity, were "activities of an essentially private nature in which the public 
has no, or at moat marginal, legitimate interest." Id. at 861 n.3. 
59. The Fifth Circuit stated: 
[Tlhe status of public figure uel non does not depend upon the desires of an 
individual. The purpose served by limited protection to the publisher of com- 
ment upon a public figure would often be frustrated if the subject of the publi- 
cation could choose whether or not he would be a public figure. Comment upon 
people and activities of legitimate public concern often illuminates that which 
yearns for shadow. 
Id. at 861. 
60. Id. at 861 (quoting Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440,445 
(1976)). 
61. !B6 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1978). 
62. Id. at  1116. 
63. Id. The Sixth Circuit stated that the facts in Orr illustrated the need for the 
public figure privilege in libel cases. The publicity in the case arose when Michigan 
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In Hutchinson v. Proxmireja the Seventh Circuit analyzed 
the libel claim of a research scientist who was the recipient of a 
"Golden Fleece Award" as a result of his expenditures of public 
funds for research on primate emotional behavior-why "rats, 
monkeys, and humans bite and clench their jaws.'"' The scien- 
tist brought an action against Senator William Proxmire, who 
had awarded the Golden Fleece Award. The Seventh Circuit de- 
termined that Dr. Hutchinson was "a public figure with regard 
to the propriety of his re~earch."~~ The Court found persuasive 
the fact that Dr. Hutchinson had "actively solicited federal 
grants to pursue his research and had secured a substantial 
amount of public funds by his  application^."^^ In addition, Dr. 
Hutchinson had published many articles regarding his research, 
and local papers had printed stories publicizing his research. Fi- 
nally, he had enjoyed access to the media to rebut any alleged 
defamation resulting from a report of the Golden Fleece 
Award? 
In Arnheiter v. Random House, I ~ C . , ~ ~  the Ninth Circuit 
held that a former naval officer, who had been relieved of com- 
mand of a U.S. Navy warship for cause, qualified as both a pub- 
brought criminal charges against Orr for securities fraud. The court found that the pub- 
licity the press provided serves an important public function "in our system of criminal 
justice because it informs the public about the law, warns the public of harm and serves 
to deter law violations. The press functions in such cases as one of the sanctions in our 
system." Id. at 1117. Given the fact that few reporters are lawyers, that they work under 
short deadlines, and that they have difficulty summarizing complex legal arguments in a 
few paragraphs, "the public importance of reporting on cases of this kind" demands that 
the law allow them "some leeway for misinterpretation and error." Id. at 1117. 
64. 579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). 
65. Id. at 1036. 
66. Id. at 1035. In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), the Supreme Court 
overturned the Seventh Circuit's holding that Dr. Hutchinson qualified as a limited-pur- 
pose public figure. See note 115 infra. 
67. 579 F.2d at 1034. 
68. Id. at 1035. The Seventh Circuit distinguished Firestone on the basis of the 
plaintiffs status, i.e., the voluntary nature of Dr. Hutchinson's actions. The court stated: 
Id. 
[Firestone], cited by plaintiff, is factually distinct from the ,present case. 
There, the Court found that Mrs. Firestone .was not a public figure since she 
did not thrust herself into the forefront of a public controversy in order to 
influence its resolution by her divorce proceedings and related press confer- 
ences. In contrast, here Dr. Hutchinson was not forced to seek public funds 
and plaintiffs numerous articles and news stories which preceded his rebuttal 
press release demonstrate his public affirmation of the soundness of the re- 
search and the continued public funding thereof. 
at 1035 n.14 (citations omitted). 
69. 578 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1978). 
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lic official and public figure.1° The court distinguished 
Arnheiter's case from Firestone by stating that in contrast to 
Mrs. Firestone's divorce 
Arnheiter's removal from command of a war vessel implicated 
criticd-isms of public concern, i.e., military decision-making 
in the conduct of war, and the selection of those entrusted with 
our national defense. Arnheiter did much more than seek re- 
versal of his removal. He used every conceivable effort to gain 
public exposure and to make his case a "cause celbbre." He 
successfully courted massive publicity and eventually pres- 
sured one congressman to hold a series of ad hoc hearings on 
the subject of his removal.'l 
As demonstrated by the foregoing cases, the federal courts 
of appeals have applied the public figure requirements enunci- 
ated in Gertz and Firestone with widely varying results.12 These 
cases illustrate the difficulty in making the inherently subjective 
determinations of who is a "public figure" and what is a "public 
controversy" as required by Gertz and Fire~tone.~" 
In Wokton, the Supreme Court found Wolston to be clearly 
not an "all-purpose" public figure,'4 i.e., one who occupied a po- 
sition of "persuasive power and infl~ence"~~ sdlicient to make 
him a public figure for all issues. Moreover, the Court held that 
Wolston was not a "limited-purpose" public figure in the context 
of commentary about his connection with Soviet espionage in 
the 1940's and 1950 '~ .~~  
The Court determined that neither Wolston's criminal con- 
tempt conviction for failure to appear before a federal grand 
70. Id. at 805. 
71. Id. 
72. Lower courts have arrived at similarly varying results in determination of public 
figure status in libel actions. See R WINFIELD, LIBEL LITIGATION 66-75 (1979). 
73. In Rosanoua u. Ployboy Enterprises, Inc., the Fifth Circuit illustrated the diffi- 
culty of determining public figure statw. ''Defining public figures is much like trying to 
nail a jellyfish to the wall." 580 F.2d at  861 n.2 (quoting Rosanova v. Playboy Enter- 
prises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga 1978)). The court observed that the public 
figure category, while eluding "a truly working definition, . . . falls within that class of 
legal abstractions where 'I know it when I see it,' in Mr. Justice Stewart's words." Id. at 
861 (citations omitted). 
74. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. at 165. 
75. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 345. 
76. 443 US. at 166. 
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jury investigating Soviet espionage nor the resultant publicity 
was s s c i e n t  to make him a limited-purpose public figure? 
Wolston had not "voluntarily thrust" or "injected" himself into 
the forefront of any Soviet espionage controversy in ah attempt 
to influence public opinion on the issues invol~ed.?~ 
Although Wolston's failure to appear in response to a sub- 
poena during the heat of the investigation may have been news- 
worthy, media attention alone is not conclusive of status as a 
public figure." The Court stated, "A libel defendant must show 
more than mere newsworthiness to justify application of the de- 
manding burden of New York Timedwo 
The Court reemphasized the need for lower courts to look at 
the " 'nature and extent of an individual's participation in the 
particular controversy giving rise to the defamation' " in order 
to determine public figure status.81 In analyzing Wolston's con- 
tempt conviction, the Court felt his failure to respond to the 
grand jury's subpoena was "in no way calculated to draw atten- 
tion to himself in order to invite public comment or influence 
the public with respect to any i s ~ u e . " ~  The Court determined 
that petitioner's failure to respond was the result of ill health 
and that the contempt citation was not intended to be used as a 
"fulcrum to create public discussion" about the espionage inves- 
tigation?' Finally, the Court concluded that criminal conduct 
alone does not automatically render the individual a public 
figure for comment on the limited range of issues relating to his 
convi~tion.~ 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Jus- 
tice Marshall, agreed that Wolston was not a "public figure" in 
1974.86 According to Justice Blackmun, the sixteen-year lapse of 
timeW between Wolston's contempt conviction and alleged de- 
77. "We decline to hold that [Wolston's] mere citation for contempt rendered him a 
public figure for purposes of comment on the investigation of Soviet espionage." Id. at 
167. 
78. Id. at 166. 
79. Id. at 167. 
80. Id. at 167-68. 
81. Id. at 167 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 352). 
82. Id. at 168. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. Justice Rehnquist concluded that "[tlo hold otherwise would create an 'open 
season' for all who sought to defame persons convicted of a crime." Id. at 169. 
85. 443 U.S. at 169-70. 
86. The majority chose not to consider whether a lapse of time may dissipate 
whatever public figure status may be applicable to a plaintiff involved in a public contro- 
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famatory publication was sufficient to erase whatever "public 
figure" distinction Wolston may have had in 1958.87 Because the 
Gertz rationale for public figure status-access to the media and 
assumption of public scrutiny-varies with the passage of time, 
Justice Blackmun theorized that a person "may be a public 
figure for purposes of contemporaneous reporting of a controver- 
sial event, yet not be a public figure for purposes of historical 
commentary on the same occ~rrence."~~ 
In his dissent, Justice Brennan concluded that Wolston 
qualified as a "limited-issue" public figure in 1974. Justice Bren- 
nan found the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit persuasive: "The is- 
sue of Soviet espionage in 1958 and of Wolston's involvement in 
that operation continues to be a legitimate topic of debate to- 
day, for that matter concerns the security of the United States. 
The mere lapse of time is not de~isive."~@ 
versy at an earlier date. Wolston abandoned the "time lapse" argument in the Supreme 
Court since both lower courts had rejected it. See 578 F.2d at 431; 429 F. Supp. at 178. 
The Court stated, "Because petitioner does not press the issue in this Court and because 
we conclude that petitioner was not a public figure in 1958, we need not and do not 
decide whether or when an individual who was once a public figure may lose that status." 
443 U.S. at 166 n.7. ' 
87. 443 U.S. at 171. According to Justice Blackmun, the determination that Wolston 
was a private citizen rather than a public figure in 1974 rendered moot the more difficult 
question of whether he was a public figure in 1958. Id. at 171-72. 
88. Id. at 171. The district court had rejected the distinction Justice Blackmun 
made between contemporaneous reporting and historical commentary. 
Surely historical comment on the espionage-related activities of Wolston and 
others who became involved in the controversy during the 1950's requires just . 
as much protection as did media coverage of the events as they occurred. The 
Constitution does not confine debate on public issues and the roles of people 
involved in them to discrete and brief periods of time. Moreover, the need hur- 
riedly to print "hot news" is but one of the rationales supporting the public- 
figure concept. Authors and publishers of books, like their news-media coun- 
terparts, are simply unable to guar&tee the truth of each and every word they 
print. To be sure, they may well have greater opportunity to investigate the 
truth of their assertions, and this might bear on a finding of actual malice. But 
to impose on them the burden of acting as would a reasonably prudent person 
under the circumstances-under either a'negligence or gross negligence stan- 
dard-would doubtless lead to destructive self-censorship. For reasonable peo- 
ple might differ about the amount of time, money, and manpower necessary to 
complete an adequate investigation, and these differences could become either 
the bases for a host of lawsuits or for decisions not to publish. Insofar as public 
figures are concerned, the Constitution accords breathing space to publishers 
in order to avoid these results and, instead, to encourage publishers not to 
refrain from printing criticism unless they know it is false or have serious 
doubts about the truth of it. 
429 F. Supp. at 178 (footnotes omitted). 
89. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 578 F.2d at 431, quoted at 443 U.S. at 
(Breman, J., dissenting). 
CASENOTES 
A. Publishers Required to Determine the Subjective Intent 
of Putative Public Figures' Actions 
In determining that Wolston's failure to obey a federal 
grand jury subpoena was not for the purpose of influencing a 
public controversy, the Court made a subjective determination 
regarding Wolston's intent. The Court rejected the decisions of 
both lower courts that Wolston's contempt conviction was deter- 
minative of his public figure status. The Court stated that the 
facts of the case did not justify a conclusion that Wolston had 
voluntarily thrust or injected himself into any controversy sur- 
rounding Soviet espionage in 1958.@O Wolston was characterized 
by the Court as having been "dragged unwillingly into the con- 
troversy,"@l and his failure to appear in response to subpoena 
was "simply . . . the result of his poor health."@2 The Court con- 
cluded there was no evidence that Wolston's contempt convic- 
tion was "intended to have, or did in fact have, any effect on any 
issue of public concern."sa The clear implication of the Court's 
analysis is that a putative public figure must not only act volun- 
90. 443 U.S. at 166. 
91. Id. .,a 
92. Id. at 168. In determining that Wolston's primary motivation for failing to ap- 
pear in response to subpoena was "his poor health," the Court chose to ignore evidence 
presented at trial suggesting a different conclusion. Wolston had testified pursuant to 
subpoena before the Special Federal Grand Jury for the Southern District of New York 
in early 1957. During the 14 months between this initial testimony and his contempt 
citation, Wolston had been subpoened five different times and the day before each 
scheduled appearance had offered an excuse for failing to appear. The U.S. attorney, 
Herbert C. Kantor, submitted an aflidavit in the August 7, 1958, contempt proceeding 
stating that 
Wolston's actions demonstrate deliberate disregard for the process of this 
Court. He has appeared or failed to appear before the Grand Jury according to 
his own whim. His refusal to appear before the Grand Jury to give testimony 
on July 1, 1958, constitutes a completed criminal contempt. In this case it has 
resulted in Wolston's avoiding testifying befoze this Grand Jury. In a last min- 
ute effort to avoid the possible punishment for his contemptuous behavior, 
Wolston sought to appear before the Grand Jury on the final day of its statu- 
tory period. Such an appearance, however, would have been meaningless. 
Appendix of Brief for Respondent at 89-90, Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., 443 U.S. 
157 (1979). In addition, according to newspaper stories covering the contempt proceed- 
ing, the federal judge who presided said, "[Tlhere is no question in my mind that there 
was a studied attempt [by Wolston] to avoid [an] appearance before this grand jury." Id. 
at 7 (citations omitted). Presumably, the federal judge determined that Wolston's guilty 
plea for criminal contempt of court was made with "actual voluntariness" before ac- 
cepting it. 
93. 443 U.S. at 168. 
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tarily but also purposefully, consciously intending to influence 
the public with respect to some public controversy. 
In Wolston, the Court provided an example illustrating the 
requirement of both purposeful and voluntary action aimed at 
influencing public opinion. Wolston might have become a lim- 
ited-issue public figure, the Court implied, had he invited a cita- 
tion for contempt "in order to use the contempt citation as a 
fulcrum to create public discussion about the methods being 
used in connection with an investigation or prose~ution."~ Jus- 
tice Blackmun's concurring opiniona6 interpreted the majority's 
holding as restricting the limited-issue public figure category to 
one who "literally or figuratively 'mounts a rostrum' to advocate 
a particular view."* According to Justice Blackmun, the major- 
ity's determination that Wolston failed to act purposefully in 
that manner was decisive of his failure to qualify as a limited- 
issue public figure.@' 
By requiring publishers to determine the subjective intent 
of a putative public figure's actions, the Court ignored and tac- 
itly overruled its previous holding in Gertz that "the communi- 
cations media are entitled to act on the assumption that . . . 
public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased 
risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them."@8 As 
the district court noted, consideration of a putative public 
figure's subjective intent is not relevant if, as Gertz indicated, 
the media may assume that the ostensibly voluntary actions of 
individuals are actually Wolston's voluntary guilty 
plea to a criminal contempt charge was the objective manifesta- 
tion of his intent.'" By subjectively analyzing Wolston's motives 
94. Id. 
95. Justice Blackrnun concurred only in result because he felt "no need to adopt so 
restrictive a definition of 'public figure' " as the majority had done. Id. at 170. 
96. Id. at  169. 
97. Id. (emphasis added). 
98. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 345. 
99. 429 F. Supp. at 177. 
100. The Court's decision in Firestone that Mrs. Firestone failed to qualify as a 
public figure rested on two grounds. See, e.g., Arnheiter v. Random House, Inc., 578 F.2d 
804,805 (1978). First, a divorce, even though highly publicized, is "not the sort of 'public 
controversy' referred to in Gertz." 424 U.S. at  454. Second, Mrs. Firestone's actions in 
obtaining a divorce were not voluntary-she had no alternative but to go to court in 
order to obtain a divorce. "Nor did respondent freely choose to publicize issues as to the 
propriety of her married life. She was compelled to go to court by the State in order to 
obtain legal release from the bonds of matrimony." Id. Unlike Mrs. Firestone, Wolston 
had several alternatives to a criminal contempt conviction and the attendant notoriety. 
Wolston was not compelled to breach his privacy by complying with the subpoena: grand 
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to determine whether or not he was a limited-issue public figure, 
the Court added another factor commentators and courts must 
consider in determining whether a particular libel plaintiff is a 
public figure. 
The implications of the Court's requirement of subjective 
analysis of a putative public figure's intent are serious. As the 
district court noted, first amendment protections and the con- 
cept of "breathing space" for the press are incompatible with a 
"test that forces the media either to comprehend a person's mo- 
tives or to refrain from commenting on his actions."lol Because 
commentators have "no way of ascertaining with cer- 
tainty-much less of proving-the actual thought processes of a 
putative public figure . . . [they] must rely on objective indicia 
of his intentions."lo2 In addition, the requirement of subjective 
intent precludes application of the limited-issue public figure 
category to those individuals who voluntarily participate in a 
public controversy without intending to purposefully influence 
public opinion.loS The New York Times rationale-a "profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public is- 
sues should be uninhibited, robust, and ~ide-open"~~~-seems 
jury proceedings are theoretically secret, and evidence indicates Wolston apparently re- 
ceived no publicity when he complied with the subpoenas and did testify. Wolston v. 
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 429 F. Supp. 177 n.32. 
He might instead have chosen to comply with the subpoena or, like respondent 
Firestone, to go to court to vindicate whatever right he may have had not to 
Id. 
comply with it. When he failed to choose either of these alternatives, he be- 
came involved in a controversy of a decidedly public nature in a way that in- 
vited attention and comment, and thereby created in the public an interest in 
knowing about his connection with espionage that outweighed his competing 
interest in remaining anonymous. 
at 177 n.33. 
101. 429 F. Supp. at 177 n.33. 
102. Id. 
103. A person who voluntarily participated in a public controversy without in- 
tending to purposefully influence public opinion would be a public figure, according to 
the district court, where his 
Id. 
participation might be significant, and the extent substantial, whether or not 
he actually craves the public's attention or wields power and influence. Thus, 
for example, one individual might seek to remain a recluse, and yet, by virtue 
of his power and influence, qualify as a public figure. And by the same token, a 
virtual nonentity desiring no attention at all may, by engaging in activity that 
appears to affect the public's well-being, qualify as well. In each case the public 
has a legitimate interest in knowing about the individual's activities, and he 
can be said to have sacrificed a measure of his interest in protecting his 
reputation. 
at 175. 
104. 376 U.S. at  270. 
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no less persuasive when applied to an individual whose actions 
are "substantial regardless of his intentions."lo6 
B. More Restrictive Definition of "Public Controversy" 
The second principal criterion in Gertz for qualification as a 
public figure is involvement in a "public ~ontroversy.'"~~ The 
Gertz Court, however, provided no standard for determining 
what is a "public controversy"; it simply found the Rosenbloom 
"public interest" test too subjective. The Court in Gertz wished 
to relieve judges of the responsibility of deciding "on an ad hoc 
basis which publications address issues of 'general or public in- 
terest' and which do not-to determine . . . 'what information is 
relevant to self-government.' "lo7 
Firestone provided little additional guidance as to what 
constitutes a "public controversy." The Court merely stated that 
"[d]issolution of a marriage through judicial proceedings is not 
the sort of 'public controversy' referred to in Gertz, even though 
the marital difficulties of extremely wealthy individuals may be 
of interest to some portion of the reading public."lo8 As the dis- 
trict court stated: 
Firestone seems to indicate that matters which are essentially 
private, such as issues in a divorce proceeding, do not become 
public for purposes of libel law solely because they are aired in 
a public forum. Thus, although divorce itself may be an impor- 
tant subject of debate, discussion of the details of particular 
divorces generally does little to advance that debate and there- 
fore does not require the degree of insulation from suit ac- 
corded by the standard in New York Tirnes.loS 
In contrast, Wolston, according to both lower federal courts, in- 
volved issues of a decidedly public nature-the investigation of 
Soviet espionage in 1958 and Wolston's connection with it. The 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated, 
"The issue of Soviet espionage in 1958 and of Wolston's involve- 
ment in that operation continues to be a legitimate topic of de- 
bate today, for that matter concerns the security of the United 
105. 429 F. Supp. at 177 11.33. 
106. Id. at 175. 
107. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 346. 
108. 424 U.S. at 454. 
109. 429 F. Supp. at 175-76 (footnotes omitted). 
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States."llo 
The Supreme Court only reached the public controversy re- 
quirement in Wolston as dictum.ll1 The Court's superficial 
treatment of the public controversy issue, however, suggests that 
not only must the issues involved be "public," but a legitimate 
"controversy" must also exist. The Court observed: 
It is difficult to determine with precision the "public con- 
troversy" into which petitioner is alleged to have thrust him- 
self. Certainly, there was no public controversy or debate in 
1958 about the desirability of permitting Soviet espionage in 
the United States; all responsible United States citizens under- 
standably were and are opposed to it.lla . 
The implication of the Court's characterization of the issues 
involved in Wolston is that a legitimate "public controversy" for 
defamation purposes does not arise until segments of society 
have "taken sides."11s The Court has in effect resurrected the 
Rosenbloom ambiguities of judges' subjective, ad hoc determina- 
tions as to whether particular issues are "controversies" consist- 
ing of "legitimate" opposition within society. Moreover, by 
phrasing the controversy in broad or narrow terms, as illustrated 
by the Court's characterization of the issues involved in WoE- 
ston, a court may manipulate the "public controversy" test to 
reach the desired result.l14 
By emphasizing the "controversy" aspect of the public con- 
troversy definition, the Court seems to have effectively narrowed 
the applicability of the New York Times standard in defamation 
cases to those issues that generate "legitimate" opposition 
within society as subjectively determined by the court 
involved.l15 
110. 578 F.2d at 431. 
111. The Court stated, "We may accept, arguendo, respondents' characterization of 
the 'public controversy' involved in this case, for it is clear that petitioner fails to meet 
the other criteria established in Gertz for public figure status." 443 U.S. a t  166 n.8. 
112. Id. The public controversies in previous defamation cases might not have quali- 
fied as legitimate "public controversies" under the Court's analysis in Wokton. All "re- 
sponsible United States citizens understandably were and are opposed to" police brutal- 
ity (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)), racial segregation (Associated 
Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)), "fixed" college football games (Curtis Publishing 
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)), pornography (Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 
(1971)), etc. 
113. 46 TENN. L. REV. 252, 267 (1978). 
114. See Note, Public Figures, Private Figures and Public Interest, 30 STAN. L. 
REV. 157, 177 (1977). 
115. Wolston left unresolved a variety of questions concerning the "public contro- 
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C. Elimination of the Involuntary Public Figure 
By requiring purposeful and voluntary action for designa- 
tion as a limited-issue public figure, the Court has eliminated 
the category of an involuntary public figure."' The following 
language from Gertz suggests that an individual might become a 
public figure by being "drawn into" a public controversy: "More 
commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn 
into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a pub- 
lic figure for a limited range of issues."117 The Court further 
stated, "Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to be- 
come a public figure through no purposeful action of his own, 
but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be ex- 
ceedingly rare."' l8 
Although the Court has never defined involuntary public 
figures, Justice Brennan in his dissent in Firestone suggested 
that they might include " 'individual[s] involved in or affected 
by . . . official action.' "ll@ W o h n ,  according to an amicus 
brief, was precisely the sort of individual "involved in or affected 
by . . . official action" who would qualify as an involuntary pub- 
lic figure under Gertz.lgo 
Amici submit although the class of involuntary public 
figures is limited, Petitioner is a member of that class. The in- 
versy" requirement. Which public controversies involve sufficiently public issues to qual- 
ify as public controversies for defamation purposes? How much controversy must exist? 
Will only a political controversy qualify? How prominent must the controversy be, e.g., 
must it involve national issues or will local disputes be acceptable in meeting the public 
controversy requirement? In Hutchinson v. Prosmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), decided dur- 
ing the same term as Wokton, the Court held that public concern over wasteful govern- 
ment expenditures was not sufficient to meet the public controversy requirement. The 
Court stated, "Respondents have not identified such a particular controversy; a t  most, 
they point to concern about general public expenditures. But that concern is shared by 
most and relates to most public expenditures; it is not sufficient to make Hutchinson a 
public figure." Id. at 135. 
116. See Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in Constitutional Policy-Making, 
61 MINN. L. REV. 645, 681 (1977); Comment, Developing Standards of Care After Time, 
Inc. v. Firestone: Experimentation Is Needed, 29 MERCER L. REV. 841,847-49 (1978); 46 
TENN. L. REV. 252, 261 (1978). But see Note, Public Figures, Private Figures and Public 
Interest, 30 STAN. L. REV. 157, 170 (1977). 
117. 418 US. at 351 (emphasis added). 
118. Id. at  345. 
119. 424 US. at 476 n.4 (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 62 
(1971)). 
120. Brief for Amici Curiae at 6, Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 
(1979). The American Society of Newspaper Editors and the National Newspaper As- 
sociation filed a joint brief as amici curiae. 
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stant case does not involve activities of a personal or private 
nature, wrongfully disclosed by government action. Rather, it 
involves governmental activities in which Petitioner, either be- 
cause of his status or activities, became enmeshed. Because of 
congressional and grand jury investigations in the 1950's into 
the activities and identities of Soviet agents in the United 
States, the Petitioner was in the focus of the spotlight illumi- 
nating the most publicly discussed issue of the day. Indeed 
even the extent to which the Congress and the Justice Depart- 
ment should have pursued their investigations and the meth- 
ods they employed were, and remain today, hotly contested 
topics.111 
The Court's continued selection from Gertz of the more re- 
strictive definition of a limited-issue public figure, which makes 
no mention of the possibility of an involuntary public figure, ar- 
gues for the elimination of that category. Moreover, since Wol- 
ston indicates that action that is not only voluntary but also 
purposeful is now required to characterize limited-issue public 
figures, it is theoretically impossible for the involuntary public 
figure to exist. The Court in Wokton suggested this result when 
it stated, "A private individual is not automatically transformed 
into a public figure just by becoming involved in or associated 
with a matter that attracts public attention."lm 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Wokiton, the Supreme Court refined its definition of a 
public figure and consequently narrowed the class of individuals 
capable of being designated "limited-issue" public figures in def- 
amation actions.lmS In the future, a limited-issue public figure 
must have voluntarily entered a public controversy with the sub- 
jective intent of influencing the outcome. In other words pur- 
poseful as well as voluntary action is required. In addition, the 
public controversy must be "legitimate," i.e., involve issues that 
generate legitimate opposition or controversy within society as 
subjectively determined by the court involved. In narrowing the 
121. Id. 
122. 443 U.S. at 167. 
123. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL L W 389 (Supp. 1979). Of the seven post- 
Firestone federal courts of appeals cases determined to involve plaintiffs meeting the 
"limited issue" public figure definition, only Arnheiter v. Random House, Inc., 578 F.2d 
804 (9th Cir. 1978), would qualify under Wokton's requirements of purposeful and vol- 
untary action in a legitimate public controversy. 
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class of persons capable of being designated limited-issue public 
figures, the Court eliminated the possibility of involuntary lim- 
ited-issue public figures. The practical effect of the decision in 
Wolston will be to inhibit publication about activities of puta- 
tive public figures where their subjective intent is not determi- 
nable and facts concerning them not absolutely verifiable. 
Gordon R. Young 
